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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic Conditions in Morocco before the 
Structural Adjustment Program 
Since 1976, the Moroccan budget deficit and current account deficit 
have expanded simultaneously. In 1974, the price of phosphate tripled, 
and the Moroccan government seized the opportunity to finance spending 
programs, such as pay raises for government employees and food price 
subsidies, through phosphate revenues. One explanation for the increased 
revenue is that public investment expenditures were financed through 
foreign loans. But in 1976, phosphate prices began to decline, and soon 
47 percent of the commodity sold for only its 1975 price (Morrison 1991, 
p. 1633). In 1978, the government attempted to introduce stabilization 
measures such as public investment reductions, wage freezes, increased 
taxes, and credit reductions, but wa s forced to abandon these measures in 
1979 after a drought and the second oil shock. 
Consequently, during 1978-80 , the budget deficit grew from 9.7 
percent to 12.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the foreign 
debt from $5.1 to $7.9 b i l l ion (Morrison 1991, p. 1634). In October 1980 
the Moroccan government entered into a second stabilization agreement with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But a 50 percent decrease in 
subsidies, increases in the prices of staples, further decreases in the 
phosphate price, increases i n the value of the dollar, and high interest 
rates forced the government to abandon this program as well. 
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In the context of these different agreements , the oilseed sector has 
been characterized by government intervention at different levels 
throughout the sector, by a monopoly crushing firm (SEPO), by lack of 
sector efficiency, by lack of improvement in arbitrage ability of 
different agents in the network, and by the high level of government 
expenditures on the consumption subsidy of vegetable oil. Therefore , the 
next structural adjustment program involving stabilization and 
liberalization measures for the whole economy has also targeted the 
liberalization of agricultural and food products pricing and marketing 
such as oilseeds and their products, and the reduction of food subsidies, 
which is the major concern of the government . 
The Agricultural Sector before the 
Structural Adjustment Program 
The growth of the Moroccan agricultural sector in the 1970s could 
not be sustained throughout the next decade . In fact, rapid popula tion 
growth (2.6 percent) , urbanization, and decreases in the real prices of 
staples (flour, sugar, and vegetable oils) together stimulated a growth in 
food demand that food production could not match. Stagnating agricultural 
export crops also led to an annual agricultural trade deficit ranging from 
$200 to $250 million (Bouanani and Tyner 1991, p. IS-III B-2). 
Virtually all forms of government intervention to offset the 
negative impact of macroeconomic policies on the agricultural sector such 
as price supports for major agricultural commodities and subsidies on 
basic products l ike flour, sugar, and vegetable oil have had negative 
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repercussions on public finance and have caused distortions in production 
and exchange. 
The Moroccan Structural Adjustment Program 
From 1981-83, Morocco ' s budget and balance of payments deficits 
worsened. And in 1983, the government was obliged to negotiate loans with 
both the IMF and the World Bank in the context of a structural adjustment 
program. This program involved stabilization and liberalization for the 
purposes of reducing aggregate demand and of increasing aggregate supply, 
through structural reforms. 
Adjustment program measures in Morocco include the following: 
Stabilization Measures 
• reduced food subsidies 
• slowed growth of d omestic credit (14.8 percent instead of 
20.l percent) 
• devaluation ( 7 percent between February and April 1984) 
• greatly reduced investment expenditures 
• slowed growth of public sector employment 
Structural Adjustment Measures 
• fiscal reform, including introduction of a value-added tax in 
April 1986 
• lowered agricultural subsidies 
raised agricultural production prices 
• breakup of the state monopoly on fertilizer and seed sales 
• abolition of price controls on 60 categories of manufactured 
products 
• elimination of export duties 
• breakup of the state monopoly on agricultural exports 
• dismantling of the system of quantitative import restrictions 
• lowered import taxes 
• improved temporary admission scheme for exporters 
• simplified customs procedures 
•raised interest rates (Morrison 1991, p. 1634). 
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Major Components of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Program 
The major components of the Agricultural Adjustment Program (AAP) 
are liberalized agricultural and food product pricing and marketing, 
restructured priorities for the public investment program, streamlined 
and/or privatized government support services, improved management of 
natural resources, and strengthened policy analysis of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (World Bank 1987, pp. 9-18). 
Price and Marketing Policies within the 
AAP for the Oilseed Sector 
One aim of the AAP was to decontrol prices and to deregulate 
domestic and international marketing of oilseeds and their products. The 
agreements called for using world market prices instead of domestic 
production costs to establish domestic support prices for oilseeds and 
meals. A safety clause stipulated that domestic support price would not 
fall below the 1986 real support price in the event of a decline in world 
market prices (Bouanani and Tyner 1991, p. IS-III B-2). In fact, this 
revised price policy for oilseeds has been in effect since 1989. 
Morocco's Commitments in the Oilseed 
Sector by the End of 1992 
The Moroccan government still must set a new price policy for meals 
and for refined oil. This policy must involve dismantling of regulations 
throughout the sector, at both domestic and international levels. I n 
addition to decontrolling prices and deregulating domestic and 
international marketing of oilseed products, the government is considering 
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entering into a free trade agreement with the European Conununity (EC) by 
the end of 1992 . 
Before its accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1977, Morocco had concluded bilateral trade agreements with many 
of its trading partners. With respect to its principal trading partner, 
the EC, with whom it conducted 54.2 percent of its total trade in 1988 (up 
from 42 percent in 1985) (GATT 1990, p. 46), Morocco enjoys preferential 
treatment . Economic relations are governed by the Cooperation Agreement 
of 1979, which replaced the Association Agreement of 1969 (GATT 1990, pp. 
19-20). Nearly 70 percent of 1986 imports from Morocco entered the EC 
under preferential treatment. In 1984, Morocco applied for membership in 
the EC, and as a first step towards full membership the government is 
aiming for free trade with the Community by the end of 1992. 
Study Objectives 
This study analyzes the effects of the Moroccan internal-external 
liberalization of pricing and marketing policies on the controversial 
Moroccan oilseed sector. In a broad sense, the oilseed sector is 
characterized by the coexistence of two major distortions: government 
intervention and a national crushing firm monopoly, SEPO, which has 
exclusive rights to produce and sell domestic crude oil and meal within 
the country. 
The oilseed sector, which includes the major agents, oilseed 
growers, a single oilseed crushing firm (SEPO), crude oil refineries, and 
feed blending companies (meal users), is closely regulated by the 
government. Government intervention is primarily the setting of the 
6 
oilseed production prices, the consumer price of refined oil, the domestic 
price of meals, and the margins, throughout the sector. The government 
also regulates the foreign trade of this sector and establishes the 
refined oil consumption program from which crude oil needs are derived and 
submitted to SEPO. 
Second, Morocco's only crushing firm, SEPO, is the cornerstone of 
this network. It monopolizes the crushing industry and second it is the 
exclusive buyer of domestic oilseeds. In short, it is the exclusive 
producer and seller of domestic crude oil to local refineries and of 
domestic meals to competitive feed blending companies . 
Many problems in the Moroccan oilseed sector have been identified by 
a national study of prices and incentives in the Moroccan agricultural 
sector. Protection of oilseed production, taxation of meal consumption, 
lack of sector efficiency, and lack of improvement in arbitrage ability of 
different agents in the network have all been scrutinized (AIRD 1990b, pp. 
161-162). 
Consequently, the present study, which focuses on the aforementioned 
two distortions, will take into account the following aspects of 
liberalization, demonstrating their effects on the Moroccan oilseed 
sector: liberalization of oil and meal pricing at internal and external 
levels, and removal of vegetable oil consumption subsidies, which are of 
major concern to the government . 
Government intervention in sector margins ( c rushing, refining, 
wholesales, retailer margins) will not be taken into account as a 
component of liberalization in this study. Because information about the 
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potential new marketing process in the oilseed sector is lacking, it is 
assumed that the Moroccan government will continue fixing margins. This 
study addresses the effects of liberalization on both supplies of crude 
and refined oils, on the country's refined oil trading pattern, and social 
welfare. 
Study Organization 
This study determines the effects of liberalization on the Moroccan 
oilseed sector and presents policy recommendations, as outlined here. The 
second chapter examines pricing and marketing policies in the Moroccan 
oilseed sector, presents the corresponding formal model, and describes the 
database used for analysis. The third chapter discusses econometric 
estimation and results before and after the free trade agreement, and the 
fourth chapter focuses on results and suggestions for sector policy 
options. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
OVERVIEW OF THE MOROCCAN OILSEED SECTOR AND A FORMAL MODEL 
Any discussion of the Moroccan o ilseed sector must take into account 
availability and uses of oilseed, responsibilities and relative importance 
of the four major economic agents, and internal and external prices and 
marketing policies undertaken by the government. Such information is 
essential for clarifying the workings not only of the sector, but also of 
the corresponding formal model. 
Overview of the Moroccan Oilseed Sector 
Oilseed availabil ity and uses in Morocco 
The Moroccan oilseed sector involves four kinds of oilseeds: the 
primary seeds, domestic sunflower and cotton, and the secondary, domestic 
and imported soybeans and rapeseed . From 1979 to 1991, domestic sunflower 
seeds, cottonseeds, soybeans, and rapeseed represented 58 percent, 38 
percent, 3 percent, and 1 percent of annual average total of oilseed 
production. 
Table 1 illustrates the evolution of domestic production of major 
oilseeds from 1979 to 1991. Although the shares of soybean and rapeseed 
i n total production of oilseeds are quite small, their shares of total 
imports of oilseeds are quite large. Limited domestic production and 
great domestic demand creates the need to import seeds. The import 
license issued by the government is used exclusively by the one crushing 
firm in Morocco, SEPO. Table 2 presents impor t trends f o r soybean and 
rapeseed from 1979 to 1989 . 
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Table 1. Domestic production of oilseeds in Morocco 
Year Sunflower Cotton Soybean Rapeseed 
(tons) 
1979 14517 7970 
1980 3451 9940 
1981 5698 14400 194 
1982 5826 13300 115 110 
1983 11870 13500 717 92 
1984 19076 15900 310 183 
1985 12484 9200 670 270 
1986 32378 14790 1694 813 
1987 45734 17350 4290 1164 
1988 88540 22190 0 600 
1989 103000 19078 0 1700 
1990 155000 13650 6860 4000 
1991 102000 14000 13000 1700 
SOURCE: AIRD 1990b. 
Table 2. Moroccan imports of soybean and rapeseed 
Year Soybean Rapeseed 
(tons) 
1979 29200 21000 
1980 24400 14000 
1981 10600 5200 
1982 35000 7200 
1983 15500 19250 
1984 19200 11000 
1985 22000 29100 
1986 17000 0 
1987 25200 13200 
1988 10848 0 
1989 21839 0 
SOURCE: AIRD 1990b. 
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on the basis of fixed technical coefficients, presented in Table 3, 
both domestic and imported oilseeds are crushed by SEPO into crude oil and 
meals. The monopoly sells crude oil to the domestic refineries, which 
derive the edible oil, and it sells meal to the feed blending companies, 
which use it as a source of protein in animal feed. Domestic production 
of crude oil and meal from domestic oilseed is given in Table 4. 
Production of crude oi l and meal from imported oilseeds may be found in 
Table 5. Despite the increasing production of crude oil from domestic and 
imported oilseeds, crude oil remains among the major imported staple food 
products . Cereals, sugar, and dairy products represent two-thirds of food 
imports (AIRD 1990a, p. 9). The residual supply to Moroccan refineries is 
imported crude oil, if domestic oil does not supply all the country ' s oil 
needs. Unlike the refineries, feed blending companies use mostly domestic 
products, which are more or less sufficient. Thus, meal imports are 
limited compared with those of crude oil. Table 6 presents data on t he 
evolution of crude oil and meal imports. 
Table 3. SEPO ' s technical coefficients used in the production of crude oil 
and meal in Morocco 
Crude oil 
(percent) 
Sunflower 0.42 
Cotton 0 . 22 
Soybean 0.18 
Rapeseed 0.40 
SOURCE: MARA/S EEMP 1992. Unless otherwise cited, all data are from 
MARA/ SEEMP databases . 
Meal 
0.40 
0 .40 
0.75 
0 .54 
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Table 4. Domestic production of crude oil and meal in Morocco from 
domestic oilseeds 
Sunflower cotton Soybean Rapeseed 
Year Crude oil Meal Crude oil Meal Crude oil Meal Crude oil Meal 
(tone) 
1979 6097 5807 1753 3188 0 0 0 0 
1980 1449 1380 2187 3976 0 0 0 0 
1981 2393 2279 3168 5760 35 146 0 0 
1982 2447 2330 2926 5320 21 86 44 59 
1983 4985 4748 2970 5400 129 538 37 50 
1984 8012 7630 3498 6360 56 233 73 99 
1985 5243 4994 2024 3680 121 503 108 146 
1986 13599 12951 3254 5916 305 1271 325 439 
1987 19208 18214 3817 6940 772 3218 466 629 
1988 37187 35416 4882 8876 0 0 240 324 
1989 43260 41200 4197 7631 0 0 680 918 
1990 65100 62000 3003 5460 1235 5145 1600 2160 
1991 42840 40800 3080 5600 2340 9750 680 918 
SOURCES: MARA/SEEMP 1992, and AIRD 1990b. 
Table 5. Domestic production of crude oil and meal in Mo r occo from 
imported oilseeds 
Soybean Rapeseed 
Year Crude oil Meal Crude oil Meal 
(tone) 
1979 5256 21900 4800 11340 
1980 4392 18300 5600 7560 
1981 1908 7950 2080 2808 
1982 6300 26250 2880 3888 
1983 2790 11625 7700 10395 
1984 3456 14400 4400 5940 
1985 3960 16500 11640 15714 
1986 3060 12750 0 0 
1987 4536 18900 5280 7128 
1988 1953 8136 0 0 
1989 3931 16379 0 0 
SOURCE: AIRD 1990b. 
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Table 6. Moroccan imports of crude oil and meal 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
SOURCES: MMI 1992 
Soybean 
Crude oil 
149639 
107428 
120130 
183675 
138136 
109800 
107772 
68600 
130289 
62897 
122570 
94934 
81069 
and MARA/SEEMP 1992 . 
Meal 
(tone) 
0 
0 
0 
5875 
0 
8299 
0 
41011 
3096 
0 
16 
0 
0 
Marketing system and price policy in the Mo r occan oilseed sector 
Rapes eed 
Crude oil 
20782 
40056 
43800 
0 
23277 
57335 
93642 
130216 
51409 
108759 
70320 
55075 
108221 
Ae mentioned in Chapter 1, the oilseed sector faces two primary 
distortions: government intervention throughout the sector and the SEPO 
monopoly. To clarify the nature of these distortions, the construction of 
the corresponding formal model, and the workings of the supply and 
distribution network, this section describes in detail the marketing 
system and government price and trade policies . 
Figure 1 presents linkages among economic agents in the 
Moroccan oilseed sector. Even if refineries and feed blending companies 
are the only users of crude oil and meal, SEPO remains the c ore of the 
Inputs 
Intermediaries 
First Trans-
formation 
Final Trans-
formation 
Intermediaries 
Final Consumption 
Domestic oilseeds Imported oilseeds 
l_ 
COMA PAA / 
Domestic crushing ~ 
firm, SEPO '--.. 
- ~' 
Wholesalers 
(through retailers) 
J 
Edible refined oil 
Figure 1. Marketing system of the Moroccan o i lseeds sector 
Imported 
crude oil 
CO STOMA 
BURAPRO 
I Imported meal 
j 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
w 
Feed blending 
companies 
Animal con-
sumption of meal 
..... 
w 
14 
marketing system. COMAPRA, an intermediary, organizes the collection of 
domestic oilseeds from farmers and the selling of seed to SEPO. 
COMAPRA is a semipublic Moroccan company that is the intermediary 
for farmers to sell products to SEPO. All related handling, packing, and 
transportation costs are paid by COMAPRA, which negotiates for an 
intervention margin annually within ministerial coaunissions. Table 7 
presents this margin from 1979 to 1991. 
COMAPRA supplies farmers with imported and domestic seeds (inputs), 
and, under the auspices of the Office Regional de Hise en Valeur (ORMVA), 
collects the domestically produced oilseeds from farmers. When they 
deliver their crops, farmers are automatically paid the domestic price 
fixed by the government . According to the World Bank proposition within 
the AAP, since 1989 the Moroccan Ministry of Agriculture has set a 
price policy for oilseeds, which is l inked to the world market price 
Table 7. COMAPRA margins 
Year Margin 
(dirham/ton) 
1979 150 
1980 150 
1981 150 
1982 175 
1983 175 
1984 175 
1985 175 
1986 230 
1987 260 
1988 350 
1989 350 
1990 350 
1991 412 
15 
rather than to the national cost of production. The new domestic price of 
oilseeds is maintained throughout the year and is fixed annually by the 
Price Commission of the Moroccan Ministry of Agriculture. 
As a first step in this new price policy, a moving average of five 
years of world prices is computed to limit the effects of short- term price 
fluctuations. Next, the border price is derived by means of the spot 
exchange rate (dirhams per dollar). To this border price, a protection 
rate of 25 percent is added, which yields the threshold price of oilseeds. 
This protection rate is consistent with the industrial sector protection 
rate fixed by the Industrial Trade Policy Adjustment (ITPA1-ITPA2 ) (AIRD 
1990b, p. 58). For oilseeds, the 25 percent protection rate is more or 
less a levy equal to the difference between the lowest priced import on 
the day and the threshold price. Transportation costs from the major 
Moroccan port to SEPO are added to the threshold price, to derive the 
fixed price. But the objective of the new price policy is to define a 
domestic price that is competitive with world market price. Therefore, 
the official domestic price of oilseeds is equal to the difference between 
the target price and the COMAPRA margin. The safety clause states: 
if the domestic price linked to the world market p rice is 
inferior to the current domestic price, the latter is taken in 
real terms, and it can be adjusted in nominal terms by the 
living costs indices. If the domestic price linked to the 
world market price is more than the current one, the former is 
taken (AIRD 1990b, pp. 58-59). 
The task of COMAPRA can be summarized as that of o rganizing domestic 
production and marketing oilseeds. As internal-external Moroccan trade is 
liberalized, this intermediary could therefore be used to help the sector 
adjust to changing policies. 
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SEPO is a private Moroccan firm in Casablanca and the only crusher 
of domestic and imported oilseeds that produces crude oil and meal for the 
country . Its processing capacity is 120,000 tons of seeds a year (AIRD 
1990b, p. 133). Although a private firm, SEPO accepts oilseed crushing 
decisions made by the Moroccan Ministry of Industry . Each year, Moroccan 
consumption of refined oil is estimated by the Ministry, which submits a 
program of refined oil needs to SEPO. SEPO subsequently derives the 
equivalent demand of crude oil and the quantities of oilseed to crush. 
The processing capacity of the monopoly is reserved primarily for crushing 
domestic sunflower and cottonseeds . The government set a crushing margin 
for SEPO in 1974, which has been revised periodically . Table 8 presents 
an evolution of this margin, which takes into account all of SEPO's 
variable and fixed costs and includes a benefit margin (MMI 1992). In 
addition to crude oil, SEPO derives meal from the processing of domestic 
Table 8. SEPO crushing margins 
Year Crushing margin 
(dirham/ ton) 
1979 210 
1980 272 
1981 383 
1982 344 
1983 347 
1984 372 
1985 400 
1986 495 
1987 400 
1988 466 
1989 462 
SOURCES: MMA/SEEMP 1992 and MMI 1992 . 
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and imported seeds . There is a fixed technical coefficient between crude 
oil and meal production, as mentioned in Chapter 1. 
Imported and domestic crude oils are distributed to refineries 
according to quotas from the Ministry of Industry. When a refinery sells 
its quota, the Ministry supervises a second distribution. Meal is sold to 
the feed blending companies, which are competitive firms, at a domestic 
price fixed annually by the government. The domestic price of meal 
affects SEPO's oilseed demand. Table 9 presents domestic meal prices 
since 1979. 
The Model 
In this section, annual data from 1979-91 are used along with a 
simple model to test certain effects of free trade with the EC on the 
Table 9. Evolution of Moroccan domestic meal prices 
Meals 
Years Sunflower Cotton Soybean Rapeseed 
(dirhams/ton) 
1979 550 450 1000 400 
1980 963 790 1750 700 
1981 963 790 1750 700 
1982 1031 845 1875 850 
1983 1137 930 2067 1033 
1984 1307 1312 2530 1404 
1985 1307 1312 2602 1404 
1986 1307 1312 2416 1404 
1987 1307 1312 2538 1404 
1988 1307 1310 2893 1400 
1989 1307 1312 3774 1404 
1990 1307 1312 3783 1404 
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Moroccan oilseed sector. The specification of the model can be improved 
by refining the underlying concepts and estimation techniques, and by 
gathering additional information. Thie model describes the workings of 
the sector and focuses on the behavior of SEPO, the central economic agent 
in marketing, processing and distribution . 
Model assumptions 
The model is based on four assumptions. 
1 . The sources of s upply of primary products are the domestic 
oilseeds sunflower and cotton and the imported oilseeds soybeans 
and rapeseed. 
2. The estimated domestic demand for refined oil is the net of 
imports. Thie residual demand is derived from the difference 
between total consumption of refined oil and total import of 
refined oil. The latter is equal to the total import of crude 
oil converted into refined oil. Because refined oil c annot be 
i mported into Morocco, this conversion is used to obtain residual 
demand, a major component of consumption. 
3. This net of imports is what SEPO must produce in equivalent c rude 
oil. 
4. The production costs of crude oil meal by SEPO are separated; in 
short, each k ind of crude oil meal produced has a unique 
production cost. These linear costs are independent of each 
other, and separability of costs is the actual procedure followed 
by SEPO. 
Description of production and production costs 
Major inputs of SEPO: oilseeds 
x1 domestic sunflower seeds, 
x2 = domestic cotton seeds, 
x3 imported soybean, and 
x4 imported rapeseed. 
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Major outputs of SEPO: crude oil and meal Crude oil is sold to 
refineries, and meal to feed blending companies. 
Table 10 . Coefficients of production and prices for the Moroccan oilseed 
sector 
Production Prices 
Crude oil Meal Crude oil Meal 
Y1 P1X1 Ml mlXl Pyl PMl 
Y2 P2X2 M2 = m2X2 Py2 PM2 
Y3 = P3X3 M3 m3X3 PY3 PM3 
Y4 P4X4 M4 m4X4 Py4 PM4 
Pi and mi are the t echnical coefficients for crude oil and meal derived 
from oilseeds . The relationship between crude oil production (Yi) and 
meal production (Mi) is: 
Therefore, 
( 2 .1 ) 
where 
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Production costs of SEPO crude oil and meal production costs are 
cl = c1Y1, 
C2 c2Y2, 
C3 C3Y3, and 
C4 = C4Y4, 
c1 = total production costs of crude oil and meal from 
sunflower seed; 
c2 total production costs of crude oil and meal from cotton 
seed; 
c3 total production costs of crude oil and meal from 
soybean; and 
c 4 = total production costs of crude oil and meal from 
rapeseed . 
All production of crude oil is sold to 14 domestic refineries. 
In addition to domestically produced crude oil, imports are used as 
inputs at the refinery demands. Therefore, o1 , o2 , o3 , and o4 represent 
imports of four different crude oils with import prices of P01 , P02 , P03 , 
and P04 . 
Major output of refineries Production of refined oil is 
R1 l 1Y1, 
R2 l 2Y2 , 
R3 -Y3Y31 and 
R4 "Y4Y4 1 
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where 
R1 = production of refined oil of sunflower seed, 
R2 = production of refined oil of cotton seed, 
R3 production of refined oil of soybean, and 
R4 = production of refined oil of rapeseed. 
The /i • S are the technical coefficients of transformation from crude oil 
to refined oil. Y1 is crude oil. 
Production costs of refineries Refined oil production costs are 
.. 
cl cl (Y1 + Ql) I 
.. 
C2 = C2 (Y2 + Q2) I 
C3 C3 (Y 3 + QJ) I and 
.. 
C4 C4 (Y4 + Q4) I 
where 
.. 
Cl = total production cost of refined oil from sunflower seed, 
C2 = total production cost of refined oil from cotton seed, 
C3 = total production costs of refined oil from soybean, and 
.. 
C4 total production costs of refined oil from rapeseed. 
The separate cost of refined oil is: 
c'! = .1 (2.2) 
The unitary cost for each kind of refined oil is 
cJ (2.3) 
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The refined oil price is PRi• so there are different prices for different 
types of refined oil. But the four refined oils are sold to the consumer 
at a convnon price, PR fixed by the government. 
Profits of refineries There are 14 refineries; therefore, the 
assumption for the 14 refineries is zero profit. 
( 
II II II II 
PR R1 + R2 + R3 + R, ) - c 1 R1 - C2 R2 - c 3 R3 - c, R, 
- P0i0 1 - Po,0 2 - Po,0 1 - Po.o ... .. 0 . 
Profits of SEPO It seems that SEPO is a profit maximizing 
monopoly. The profit maximizatio n problem for a monopoly is generally 
written 
max PY - C( Y) . 
P , Y 
The mo nopo l i st will usually wis h t o produce the amount that c o nsumers 
demand. The associated constrai nt c an be written as the equality 
Y = D(P) (Varian 1992, p . 234). Substituting f o r Yin the object i ve 
funct i on , we obtain 
max p D(P) - C [D ( P)) . 
p 
For SEPO, 
(2 . 4) 
wher e 
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Pyi domestic prices of the four kinds of crude oil; 
Yi quantities of the four kinds of crude oil produced; 
PMi = domestic prices of the four kinds of meal fixed by the 
government; 
Mi quantities of the four kinds of meal produced; and 
C(Yi,Mi) = separated production costs of the four kinds of crude oil 
and meal . 
To simplify, SEPO's production costs can be written C(Yi) without mea l, 
because when SEPO crushes Xi ton of seeds, it derives (piXi) crude oil , 
and (miXi) meal. Therefore, by the fixed relation between crude oil and 
meal production, when SEPO produces Yi ton of crude oil, automatically Mi 
ton of mea l is produced. 
Substituting Mi by equation (2.1), and C(Yi,Mi) by C(Yi), we can 
derive SEPO's profit: 
( 2. 5) 
The first-order condition states that at the profit maximizing choice of 
output , marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. This condition can be 
expressed by the price equation of any oilseeds c rusher: 
Poilseed + crushing margin 
where 
Poilseed = price of oilseeds, 
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A = quantity of oilseeds needed to produce one ton of oil, 
B quantity of oilseeds needed to produce one ton of meal, 
Pon price of oil, and 
Pmeal price of meal. 
The right-hand side of this equation sums the marginal revenue received 
from oil and meal from every unit of oilseed crushed. The left-hand side 
is the marginal cost of acquiring and crushing a unit of oilseed (Morgan 
1992, p. 23) . 
Model specification of the Moroccan oilseed sector 
Before SEPO's profit is maximized, all components of the profit 
equation (2.5) can be converted into equivalent refined oil. This 
convention is explained by the fact that each year SEPO produces the 
equivalent of the residual demand of refined oil. This demand is derived 
by subtracting total import of crude oil in equivalent refined oil from 
total consumption of refined oil: 
where 
(2.6) 
DR = actual consumption of refined oil, 
MR imports of crude oil, in refined oil equivalents (using the 
technical coefficient of transformation from crude oil to 
refined oil (1 1 )), and 
R residual demand of refined oil or demand of refined oil net 
of imports. 
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Generally, the refined oil consumption is a function of its own-price 
(PR), the price of its substitute (P0 ), or the price of olive oil, and the 
income level (I). Therefore, residual demand of refined oil is a function 
of the same variables: 
But estimation of the residual demand for the three variables showed that 
olive oil price is not a significant variable. A study by Stryker (1989) 
of the behavior of Moroccan consumers confirms this fact. Consequently, 
the price of olive oil is suppressed in the estimation of the residual 
demand of refined oil: 
R f(PR, I) · 
The residual demand of refined oil is estimated as 
where 
R=C+aPR+bI, 
( 2. 7) 
C the intercept of the residual demand of refined oil, 
a = the estimated coefficient of the exogenous variable PR , 
PR the domestic price of the refined oil exogenous variable, 
I the Moroccan income exogenous variable, 
b = the estimated coefficient of the exogenous variable I' and 
R = the estimated residual demand of the refined oil endogenous 
variable. 
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The estimated residual demand of refined oil produced by SEPO is 
subsequently substituted into SEPO's profit equation. After the first 
component of equation (2.5) is converted into refined oil, the revenue to 
SEPO from the production of refined oil is 
where 
R the residual demand refined oil, which should be produced by 
SEPO in crude oil equivalents; and 
PR the price at which all refined oil will be sold. 
If the second component of equation (2.5) is converted into equivalent 
refined oil, the revenue of SEPO from the production of meals from the 
total production of refined oil (R) is 
where 
SEPO's total revenue earned from total production 
of the four kinds of meal. 
(2.8) 
The equivalent of crude oil in refined oil is Ri = Yi/i, and each portion 
(Yi/i) o f refined oil is 8i percent of the total production of refined 
oil, i.e . , 
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(2.9) 
where 
R = the total production of refined oil. 
The ratio of the technical coefficients of crude oil to meal (ki) are 
transformed into refined oil meal as follows: 
Therefore, the total revenue of SEPO from meals is 
where 
PM1k 1 (8 1R) + PM2k2( 82R) + PM3k3(83R) + PM4k4(84R) 
R(PM1k181 + PM2k282 + PM3k383 + PM4k48 4] 
R(A) , 
PMi = given price of meal, and 
ki8i given constants. 
(2.10) 
The last components to convert i nto equivalent refined oil are the 
cost equations. The ordinary least squares procedure (OLS) is used to 
estimate SEPO 's separated linear costs for crude oil. The estimated costs 
equation is 
where 
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(2.11) 
TCi total production cost for a kind of crude oil, and 
Yi = total production of crude oil (the reason for keeping only 
Yi and not Mi has already been explained). 
The transformation of crude oil production costs to equivalent refined oil 
is achieved simply by dividing the estimated coefficient (ai) of the 
exogenous variable (Yi) by the technical coefficient of transformation of 
crude oil to refined oil ( I i), and by retaining the intercept found in the 
first estimation. Separated estimated production costs converted into 
equivalent refined oil costs are, 
(2.12) 
where ao1 + ao2 + ao3 + ao4 = ao is the intercept of the estimated 
production costs of equivalent refined oil; and a 1181 + a 1282 + a 1383 + 
a14~4 = a 1 is the estimated coefficient of R. 
Profit maximization for SEPO When all components of SEPO ' s 
profit are transformed into equivalent refined oil , the profit equation 
(2. 5) is 
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(2 .13 ) 
substituting R for the estimated residual demand, we can pose SEPO's 
maximizat i on problem as 
From the first-order condition for the problem, PR• is: 
where 
( _ __£_ + ~ ) + bI + 
2a 2 -2a 
Aa 
-2a 
P~ = (-__£_ + cx 1 
2a 2 
( __.£._ ) I - A 
2a 2 
PR• = the optimal price of refined oil 
C < 0 = intercept of the estimated residual demand, 
0 
a < 0 = estimated coefficient of PR in the residual demand, 
(2.14) 
( 2.15) 
b > 0 estimated coeff icient of income (I) in the residual demand, 
estimated coefficient o f R in the estima t ed cost equation of 
refined oil, and 
A > 0 
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Optimal price for SEPO From this optimal price of refined oil 
(PR*), the optimal price of each crude oil (Pyi*) at which SEPO will sell 
its optimal output (Yi*) is derived by means of 
(2.16) 
where 
~i the technical coefficient of transformation of crude oil to 
refined oil. 
The optimal price of crude oil, therefore, is positively related 
to income and negatively related to meal value. As expected, the sign of 
the estimated c oefficient of the meal value is negative. As Bicherton 
(1990, p. 10) writes, 
This relationship reflects the joint product nature of 
oilseeds which ties meal and oil market together, transmitting 
disturbances from one to the other. For example, the 
consequent higher meal price induces oilseed crushers to 
process additional o i lseeds, thus increasing the supply of oil 
as well as meal. In the absence of any other market 
disturbances, the soybean oil price will fall . 
Concerning the positive sign on the estimated coefficient of income, 
increases in income will lead to increases in oil demand and thus to 
increases in the price of oil. 
Optimal output f o r SEPO The optimal output of refined o il (R* ) 
is derived by substituting the opt i mal price of refined oil (PR* ) i nto the 
estimated residual demand for ref i ned oil: 
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R" = C + aP; + bI • (2.17) 
The optimal output for each kind of crude oil (Yi*> that SEPO would 
produce is 
Yj (2.18) 
where 
ai the share of each refined oil in the total production of 
refined oil. 
The Database 
The sample period covered by this study is 1979 to 1991. This 
period was chosen because the data on the required variables for the 
model were available only for those years. The variables studied are: 
(l) domestic production of seeds, meals, crude oil, and refined oil; (2) 
imports of crude oil and oilseeds; (3) domestic prices of oilseeds, crude 
oil, meal, and refined oil; (4) world market prices of crude oil, 
oilseeds, and meals; (5) income; (6) production c osts of crude oil meal, 
production costs of refined oil, t echnical c oefficients of crude oil meal 
derived from seeds, and technic al coefficients of the transformation of 
crude oil to refined o i l; ( 7 ) domestic c o nsumption o f refined oil; (8) 
exchange rate; and ( 9 ) convers ion coefficient from liter to k i lo. 
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Domestic production of seeds, meals, crude oil, and refined oil 
The domestic production data for oilseeds, meals, and crude and 
refined oils are obtained from the Moroccan Ministry of Agriculture, 
service dee Etudes Economiques de marches et de prix (MARA/SEEMP) and from 
the AIRD studies of Morocco (1990). 
Imports of crude oil and oilseeds 
Data on imported oilseeds are obtained from both MARA/SEEMP and AIRD 
studies (1990). Imported crude oil data are obtained from MARA/ SEEMP and 
from the Moroccan Ministry of Industry (MMI). 
Domestic prices of oilseeds, crude oil , meal, and refined oil 
Data on domestic prices of oilseeds and meals are obtained from 
MARA/SEEMP. The refined oi l price is the consumer price of refined oil 
fixed each year by the government for a one-liter bottle. Data are 
obtained from the MMI. 
World market prices of crude oil, oilseeds, and meals 
World market price data for oilseeds (soybean, rapeseed) are the CIF 
Rotterdam prices in U.S . dollars per ton. For imported crude oil of 
soybean, rapeseed, cotton seed, and sunflower seed, the world market price 
is the FOB ex-mill Rotterdam for the first two, and the CIF Rotterdam for 
the last two. The wo rld market price of meals is the CIF Rotterdam for 
soybean and sunflower meal, the CIF Europe for cotton meal, and the FOB 
ex-mill Hamburg for rapeseed meal. All data are obtained from USDA ' s 
Foreign Agricultural Service Oilseeds and Products (August 1992). 
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Income 
The income variable used in this study is the Moroccan Gross 
Domes tic Product series (GDP) . These data, in billions of dirhams, are 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks for 1985 and 1990. 
Production costs of crude o i l ,meal, refined oil, and all technical 
coefficients 
These data for 1979-84 and 1987 are derived from the cost price 
structures of oils are obtained from MARA/SEEMP . For the remaining years, 
1985-86 and 1988-91, the cost price structures of oils are set by 
following the same procedure used for the previous years. The variables 
o f this cost price structure are changed each time actual data are needed, 
according to which part are obtained from the MMI (1992) . 
Domestic consumption of refined oil 
Data regarding domest ic consumption of refined oil are obtained from 
the MMI (1992). 
Exchange rate between dirham 1Q!:!l and dollar l.il 
This exchange rate (DH/ $) is obtained from the IMF's 1988 
International Financial Statistics for 1979- 89, and for 1990-91, from the 
MARA/SEEMP publication (1992). 
Conversion coefficient from liter to k i lo 
The conversion coeffic ient between l liter and its equival ent in 
kilos is 0 . 926. This c oeff i cient is obtained from the AIRD studies of 
Morocco (1990). 
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CHAPTER 3. 
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION 
This chapter considers the residual demand of refined oil function 
(Equation 2.7), and uses the ordinary least squares procedure (OLS) 
(Gujarati 1988; Pindyck 1 99la) assuming that the standard assumptions 
underlying the OLS are met, and employs the software program SHAZAM 
(Pindyck 199lb) to estimate the cost equations of four kinds of crude oil 
(Equation 2.11). The chapter then considers the conversion of equation 
costs to equivalent refined oil , the function of the optimal price of 
refined oil (Equation 2 .15), the function of the optimal output of refined 
oil (Equation 2 .17) , and the optimal price and output of crude oil at the 
SEPO level. Finally, SEPO's profit from the production of refined and 
crude oil is derived. All these estimations are performed on data 
gathered before free trade. The second part of the chapter contains 
adaptatio ns of the functions and equations under the free trade scenario. 
Econometric Estimation before Free Trade 
Function of residual demand of refined oil 
The residual demand of refined oil, 
R C + aPR + bI , 
is a function of income (I) and the consumer price of refined oil (PR)· 
The OLS estimate of this equation yields an estimate of the coefficients a 
and b. Another variable, the price of a substitute of refined oil (olive 
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oil), was also tested and excluded on the basis of its statistical 
insignificance. The results of estimating the residual demand of refined 
oil are 
Re -2594.9 - 4.5793 PR + 404.33 I 
(12512) (3.9886) (124.94) 
R2 = .79, F = 18.911, OF 10. 
The statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of 
residual demand of refined oil was established by t-tests with n - k 
degrees of freedom, by testing the hypotheses 
H0 : a = b = O and 
HA : negation, 
where n is the number of observations , k is the number of regressors, and 
a and b are the joint coefficients of the regression. 
Next, the F test was used: 
R 2 /(k-l ) 
(l-R 2 )/(n-k) 
where n and k are as defined previously, and R2 is the coefficient of 
determination. 
As expected, the sign is negative for the estimated coefficient of 
own price of refined oil. The regression indicates, however, that this 
estimated coefficient is insignificant at conventional 5 or 10 percent 
levels of significance. Given the importance of the own price effects, 
the variable is retained in the equation. The own price for an individual 
vegetable oil should theoretically be quite elastic, reflecting the 
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availability of numerous substitutes. Olive oil was omitted from the 
equation because of its insignificant effect. Perhaps variables that 
should have been included in the estimating equation were not, so the 
estimate of own price effect was relatively inelastic. The estimated 
coefficient of income (b) is significant at these levels. 
The partial regression coefficient of -4.5793 means that i f income 
(I) is held constant, the actual consumption of refined oil decreased on 
average by about 4.6 tone. Likewise, i f the price of refined oil (PR) is 
constant, the coeffic ient value of 404.33 implies that, over the same 
period, the actual consumption of refined oil (R) increased . This 
increase was, on average, about 404.33 tons for every one billion dirham 
increase in (I). In terms of prior expectations, both explanatory 
variables (PR and I) have the expected signs. Finally, from the estimated 
r egression, we observe that the F value (18 .911) is clearly significant at 
the usual levels. 
Production cost equations for crude oil 
The OLS is used to estimate the separated production cost equation, 
for crude oil and meal of sunflower, cotton, soybean, and rapeseed. The 
results are provided in Table 11. The statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficients of these equations was determined by the same 
procedure as that used for the residual demand of refined oil. 
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Table 11. Estimated production cost equation 
Estimated Sunflower Cottonseed Soybean Rapeseed 
coefficients 
Intercept -10,014,000 -3,965,300 2,823 , 500 -567,630 
Standard error (2,188,600) (1,576,100) (2,396,600) (2,401,100) 
ai 5,475.5 3,387.5 2,005 .9 3,056.9 
Standard error (78.720) (486.01) (601.10) (421.74) 
R2 0.9977 0.8154 0.5530 0 .8537 
F 4838.045 48.580 11.135 52.538 
df 11 11 9 9 
For the sample period, for sunflower and cotton, the coefficient of 
production of crude oil (ai) is significant at the 5 percent and 10 
percent levels. For soybean and rapeseed, costs were estimated over a 
period of 11 years because data on production cost for the two last years 
were unavailable. The coefficients of production costs for crude oil from 
soybeans and rapeseed are significant at the same levels. The R2 values 
of sunflower, cotton , and rapeseed represent a fairly significant level of 
explanatory power. For soybean, the R2 could be improved by using 
additional information and production costs data. 
Production ~ equations in equivalent refined oil 
The production cost equations for crude oil in equivalent refined 
oil are derived by converting the estimated coefficient of production 
costs of crude oil into refined oil and by keeping the estimated 
intercept. These results are summarized in Tables 12 and 13. 
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Table 12. Conversion of estimated coefficient of production costs for 
crude oil into equivalent refined oil 
Coefficients Sunflower cottonseed Soybeans Rapeseed 
ai 5475.500 3387.500 2005.900 3056.900 
1' i 0.966 0.884 0.960 0.948 
ai 5668.200 3832.013 2089 . 479 3224.578 
Table 13. Production cost equations for crude oil in equivalent refined 
oil 
Estimated 
coefficients 
Intercept 
Sunflower 
-10,014,000 
5,668.200 
Optimal price of refined oil 
Cottonseed Soybeans Rapeseed 
-3,965,300 2,823,500 -567,630 
3,832.013 2,089.479 3,224.578 
By incorporating the estimated residual demand of refined oil and 
the estimated cost equations in (2.15), Table 14 presents the optimal 
price of refined oil (PR*) for the sample periods shown. 
Optimal price of crude oil 
The most important variable to derive from the optimal price of 
refined oil (PR*> is the optimal pr i ce of crude oil (Py 1*), which should 
have been set by SEPO. From equation (2.16), differences are derived (see 
Tables 15 and 16). 
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Table 14. Optimal prices of refined oil 
Years 
1979 
19 80 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
p * R 
(dirham/ton) 
4092.773 
3755.160 
4359.997 
4053.809 
5210.512 
5357.155 
6107 . 989 
7512.470 
7646.973 
9146.096 
9206 . 059 
10713 .110 
11637. 640 
Table 15. Optimal prices of crude sunflower and cotton oil 
Pyi * 
Sunflower Cotton 
Py Difference Py 
p * * p * Year y observed Py - Py y observed 
(dirha.m/ton) 
1979 3953.61 3556 . 48 -397.13 3618 . 011 3277. 543 
1980 3627.48 4641. 02 1013.53 3319.561 4326.402 
1981 4211.75 4905.30 693.56 3854.237 4830.947 
1982 3915 . 97 6525 . 38 2609.40 3583.567 5892.722 
1983 5033.35 6770.19 1736.83 4606.093 6121. 200 
1984 5175.01 7393.40 2218.39 4735.725 6140.561 
1985 5900.31 9153.12 3252.80 5399 . 462 7791. 579 
1986 7257.04 10479.79 3222.74 6641. 023 9239.227 
1987 7386.97 10438.05 3051. 07 6759.924 8829 . 690 
1988 8835.12 10816.69 1981. 56 8085.149 9129.690 
1989 8893.05 11299 . 39 2406.33 8138.156 5981. 357 
1990 10348.87 11313. 68 964.80 9470.396 9735.902 
1991 11241.96 11554.36 312.39 10287.680 9904.084 
Difference 
Py - Py * 
-340.468 
1006 . 840 
976 . 709 
2309.154 
1515.106 
1404.835 
2392 .116 
2598.203 
2069.765 
1044 . 540 
1443.200 
265.506 
-383.596 
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Table 16. Optimal prices of crude s oybeans and rapeseed oil 
Pyi * 
Soybeans Rapeseed 
Py Differ ence Py Di fference 
p * * p * * Year y observed Py - Py y observed Py - Py 
(dirham/ton) 
1979 3929.062 5690.11 1761.047 3879. 949 3765 .279 -114.670 
1980 3604.954 3835 . 11 230.156 3559 .892 3951 . 375 391.483 
1981 4185 .597 52 48 . 72 1063.122 4133 . 277 5406 . 939 1273. 661 
1982 3891. 656 6386.00 2494.343 3843.010 5730.798 1887.787 
1983 5002.092 8932.60 3930.807 4939.565 7577.503 2837 .9 37 
1984 5162.869 5947.72 804.851 5078 .583 8625.661 3547.077 
1985 5863.669 709 1. 94 1228.270 5790 .3 73 6923.960 1133.586 
1986 7211.971 6764.19 -447.781 
1987 7341. 094 9518 . 71 2175.615 7249.330 562 4 .780 -1624.550 
1988 8780.252 8438.77 -341. 482 
1989 8837. 817 1275.48 - 7562. 330 
* Py s for soybeans and for rapeseed were der ived for only the sample 
period 1979-89 because data are unavailable for 1990 and 1991. For 
rapeseed in 1986 , 1988 , and 1989, Py* was not derived : Morocco imported 
no rapeseed in these years, so no c rude oil was produced. 
According to t hese data, it seems that SEPO has set a crude oil 
price higher than the optimal price. On average, the observed price is 
higher by 29 percent, 24 percent, 17 percent, and 26 percent for 
sunflower, cotton, soybeans, and rapeseed. 
Optimal production of refined oil 
By subst ituting the optimal price of refined oil pR* i nto the 
estimated residual demand of refined oil , we obtain the optimal production 
of refined oil, R* . 
Table 17. 
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Optimal production of refined oil 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
R* 
(ton) 
3747.697 
10165.900 
9393 . 565 
16403.740 
13629.870 
18295 . 510 
21799.560 
25565.220 
26417.010 
28499.900 
32074.530 
33255.850 
37917.410 
From R*, the optimum of each kind of crude oil that would have been 
produced under optimal pricing is derived (Yi*>· 
Optimal production of crude oil 
Tables 18 and 19 summarize the results . It seems that, on average, 
crude oil production has been either more or less than optimal. This 
difference between actual and optimal production can be explained by the 
effects of two factors. First, each refined oil share of total production 
has changed within the sample period. Second, whether a specific kind of 
crude oil will be produced depends upon production decisions regarding the 
other kinds of crude oil. Finally, sufficiently comprehensive information 
and sophisticated tools were unavailable. 
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Table 18. Optimal production of crude sunflower and cottonseed oil 
y. * 
l. 
Sunflower Cotton 
y Difference y Difference 
Year y* observed y - y* y* observed y - y* 
(ton) 
1979 1125.085 6097 4971. 914 322.200 1753 1430.799 
1980 1157.607 1449 291. 392 1724.983 2187 462.017 
1981 2528.288 2393 -135.288 3294.123 3168 -126.123 
1982 2886.786 2447 -439.786 3525.690 2926 -599.690 
1983 3950 .686 4985 1034.313 2312.760 2970 657.239 
1984 7954.569 8012 57 .430 3518 .367 3498 -20.367 
1985 5190. 371 5243 52.629 1972.810 2024 51.189 
1986 18260.870 13593 -4667 .870 4337.989 3254 -1083.980 
1987 16134. 610 19208 3073.387 3287.184 3817 529.815 
1988 25077.550 37187 12109. 440 3223.970 4882 1658.029 
1989 28222.930 43260 15037 .060 2721 . 255 4197 1475.744 
1990 32705.020 65100 32394.970 150.479 3003 2852.521 
1991 36896.850 42840 5943.141 257.358 3080 2822.642 
Table 19. Optimal production of crude soybeans and rapeseed oil 
y. * 
l. 
Soybean Rapeseed 
y Difference y Difference 
Year y* observed y - y* y* observed y - y* 
(ton) 
1979 975.963 5256 4280.037 1541. 774 8400 6858.225 
1980 3494.528 4392 897.472 4396.644 5600 1203.355 
1981 2054.842 1908 -146.842 2179 .941 2080 -99.941 
1982 7518.380 6300 -1218.386 3460 . 704 2880 -580 .704 
1983 2129.667 2790 660.333 6038.550 7700 1661. 450 
1984 3430.408 3456 25. 592 4438.784 4400 -38.784 
1985 4087.417 3960 -127.417 11727. 610 11640 -87. 611 
1986 4260.870 3060 -1200 .870 0.000 0 0.000 
1987 3852 .480 4536 683.519 4458.567 5280 821. 433 
1988 1484.369 1953 468.630 0.000 0 0.000 
1989 2672.877 3931 1258.122 0.000 0 0 .000 
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It seems that actually SEPO is producing more or less than the 
optimal output and selling it at a price higher than the optimal price. 
As suggested by Stanley R. Johnson1 , this could be the result of the two-
stage decision-making process at the SEPO level; in other words, SEPO is 
going through two rounds of negotiations. In the first stage, SEPO 
negotiates its prof it maximizing output in crude oil that should be 
produced. Then, in a second stage, SEPO negotiates the output price in 
order to get more than the monopoly price. This is due to the subsidies 
on refined oil paid by the government to the refineries. 
SEPO's profit from refined oil production before free trade 
Equation (2.13) is used to determine actual per unit profit from 
refined oil production, at the level of SEPO, and before free trade. 
Thus, the profit equation is 
where 
PR: actual domestic price of refined oil; 
R: actual production of refined oil; 
A: L(PMiKiBi), the sum of revenues from production of meals; 
aa: estimated intercept of the production cost equation of refined 
oil; and 
a 1 : estimated coefficient of the exogenous variable (R) of the 
production cost equation of refined oil. 
1stanley R. Johnson, Di rector o f the Center of Agricultural and Rural 
Development (CARD) of Iowa State University and C. F. Curtiss Distinguished 
Professor of Agriculture. 
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Substituting the known values for these variables into the profit 
equation, we present total prof it and per unit prof it from production of 
refined oil in Table 20. 
Actual profit is an important variable and is used later to derive 
the change in producer surplus under free trade scenario. 
Table 20. Total profit and per unit profit from production of refined 
oil before free trade 
Total Profit Exchange Profit 
Year profit per unit rate per unit 
(dirharns) (dirharns/ (dirharns/ (dollars/ 
ton) dollars) ton) 
1979 17620988.43 861. 73 3.89 221. 01 
1980 47512228.21 3695.10 3.93 938.65 
1981 35418900.38 3972.66 5 . 17 768.06 
1982 73429148.14 5348.47 6.02 888.01 
1983 85647759 . 73 4916.92 7 .11 691. 42 
1984 105450763.30 5755.80 8.81 653.29 
1985 146418119. 60 6750.41 10.06 670.85 
1986 118366481. 40 6245.99 9.10 686.04 
1987 189408974.60 6053.50 8.35 725. 04 
1988 206885015.20 4912.59 8.17 600.99 
1989 275566525.00 5592.64 8.45 661. 80 
SEPO ' s profit from crude oil production before free trade 
The total profit from crude oil production is derived using this 
equation: 
1t R X ~ I X Y f 1tc1 ' 
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where 
rrR = total profit from production of refined oil; and 
rrci total profit from production of crude oil from oilseed. 
8i and ~i are as explained in Chapter 2. Then, the sum of "ci yields 
total profit from total production of crude oil (rrc>· From "c' the per 
unit profits in dirhams and in dollars are derived. Table 21 summarizes 
these results. 
Table 21. Total profit and per unit profit from production of crude oil 
before free trade 
Profit per Profit per 
Year Total profit unit unit 
(dirhams) (dirhams/ton) (dollars/ton) 
1979 16770599.53 779. 81 199.99 
1980 44867697 . 59 3292.32 836.34 
1981 33129422 . 66 3469.41 670.77 
1982 69330333 . 09 4763.99 790.97 
1983 80957688 . 41 4389.14 617.21 
1984 99845000 . 79 5155.69 585.18 
1985 137571536 . 80 6016.16 597.88 
1986 111636163 . 20 5606.19 615.77 
1987 180555999 . 20 5497.88 658.50 
1988 196106305 . 90 4454.73 544.98 
1989 264483239 . 30 5146.79 609.04 
Free Trade Scenario 
First, total consumption of refined oil at world market price is 
derived using both equation (3 . 1) and the world market price. Next, 
domestic production by SEPO in refined oil equivalents is estimated to 
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derive refined oil imports, as shown in Figure 2, and to compute the 
change in SEPO's surplus after free trade. In addition, the change in 
consumer surplus after free trade is derived by computing the shaded area 
of Figure 3. Finally, social welfare for a typical year is determined, 
taking into account changes in producer surplus (SEPO), consumer surplus, 
and government revenue. 
Total demand of refined oil at domestic price 
The demand for refined oil estimated at the domestic price is 
Rd= C + aP/ + bI , 
(3.1) 
where 
total consumption of refined oil at domestic price; 
domestic price of refined oil; 
I = income; 
C = estimated intercept; 
a = estimated coefficient of the first exogenous variable, 
b = estimated coefficient of the second exogenous variable, I. 
The results of estimating equation (3.1) are 
Rd 144010 - 1.4272 pRd + 404.38 I 
(14662) (4.6741) (146 . 41) 
R2 0.82, F = 23.95, OF = 10 . 
Figure 2. 
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R 
Consumption of refined oil at world market price (Rd), 
production of SEPO (Rw9 ), and imports of refined oi~ (MR) 
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R 
Figure 3. Change in consumer surplus after free trade 
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The procedure used to test the statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficients is the same as that used in the first part of 
Chapter 3. For the sample period, as expected, the sign of the estimated 
coefficient for the own price of refined oil is negative. The regression, 
however, shows that the regression coefficient a is insignificant at the 
conventional 5 or 10 percent levels of significance. For reasons stated 
earlier, the own price of refined oil is retained, and the price of olive 
oil is excluded. In terms of prior expectations, both explanatory 
variables, PRd and I, have the expected signs. From the estimated 
regression, we observe that the F-value (23.95) is obviously significant 
at the usual levels. 
Total demand of refined oil at world market pr i ce 
In essence, the process to derive the refined oil demand for free 
trade is simple. First, equation (3.1) is modified by replacing 
domestic price ( PRd) with world market price (PRw). The proxy for world 
market price of refined oil is the crude soybean oil Rotterdam price 
converted into refined oil price. There are several reasons for using 
this proxy : 
1. The published world prices are of crude, not refined, oil; 
2. The main problem with the weighted average of the four prices of 
crude oil (sunflower, cottonseed, soybeans, and rapeseed) is the 
high multicollinearity among the four prices; 
3 . Crude soybean oil is the most imported by Morocco; 
4. The world price of crude soybean oi l is the leading price on the 
world market; and 
5 . The largest soybean oil exporter is the European Conununity (Crowder 
1990, p. 13), the trading partner with whom Morocco will make its 
Table 22. 
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Derived Moroccan border prices of refined oil 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
p w 
R 
(dirham/ton) 
2583.316 
2329.319 
2618.692 
3049.394 
5518.961 
5947.454 
4193.127 
3291. 240 
4053.188 
3900.067 
4058.400 
free trade agreement . Table 22 summarizes the refined oil 
border prices assumed in this study . 
The estimated refined oil consumption level under free trade 
is presented in Table 23. A history of this consumption appears in 
Figure 4. 
Domestic production of refined oil under free trade 
Because estimated production costs are linear, SEPO's optimal 
production of refined oil under free trade cannot be derived by maximizing 
firm profit. These production costs, when estimated in quadratic form, 
tend to reduce R2 . Therefore, the logical procedure is to estimate SEPO ' s 
potential capacity rather than to derive optimal production, and can be 
estimated as: 
(3.2) 
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Table 23. Demand for refined oil at the world market price 
where 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
(ton) 
165410.8 
170646.1 
172230.7 
177224.8 
176223.5 
180949.8 
190396.8 
201882.4 
202262.9 
211430.3 
215054.0 
Yi the average of total output of crude oil for the sample period 
1979-1989, 
\CU percentage utilized of SEPO capacity (on average, the 
percentage CU is 75 percent (AIRD 1990b, p. 133), and 
PCci = estimated potential capacity of S.EPO to produce different types 
of crude oil. 
Next, equation (3.2) is transformed into refined oil equivalents by 
technical coefficients: 
(3.3) 
where 
I i technical coefficients, and 
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estimated potential capacity of SEPO to produce different 
types of refined oil. 
Arriving at the sum of Peri' we write the potential capacity of SEPO to 
produce refined oil as 
(3.4) 
where 
PCR = estimated potential capacity of SEPO in the production of 
refined oil. 
The estimated PCc and PCR are equal to 32,494.30 tons and 30,909.94 tons 
each year. 
Imports of refined oil under free trade 
These imports are derived as: 
where 
RW total demand of refined oil at world price, 
PCR estimated potential capacity of SEPO to produce refined 
oil, and 
MR imports of refined oil under free trade. 
Figure 5 presents data on the import trend of refined oil under free 
trade . Imports of refined oil then include different kinds of oil 
( 3. 5) 
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Figure 5. Imports o f refined oil under free t rade scenario 
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(sunflower, cottonseeds, soybeans, rapeseed). Nevertheless, because of 
high substitutability among the different kinds of refined oil, imports in 
equivalent crude oil cannot be determined. 
SEPO's profit from refined oil production under free trade 
When PRd i s substituted with PRW, R with PCR, and A with ([PMiwki~i) 
instead of ([PMidki~i) in equation (2.13), SEPO's profit equation under 
free trade becomes 
where 
P w. R . 
(3.6) 
the world market price of refined oil, as explained above; 
the estimated potential capacity of SEPO to produce refined 
oil; 
A: [(PMiwki~i), total revenue of SEPO earned from total 
production of the four kinds of meal; 
PMiW: the world market price of sunflower, cotton, soybean, and 
rapeseed meal; 
a 0 : estimated intercept of the production costs of equivalent 
refined oil ; and 
a 1 estimated coefficient of the exogenous variable in equivalent 
refined oil. 
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When the figures for these different variables are inserted into equation 
(3. 6), total profit and per unit profit of SEPO's production of refined 
oil are as presented in Table 24. 
SEPO's profit from crude oil production under free trade 
The per unit profit from production of crude oil, in dirhams and in 
dollars, is derived using the procedure outlined above. Table 25 
summarizes these results. 
Table 24. 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Total profit and per unit profit from refined oil production 
under free trade 
Free Trade 
Total profit Profit per unit Profit per unit 
(dirhams) (dirham per ton) (dollar /ton) 
-1387330.14 -44.88 -11. 51 
8853689.36 286.44 72.76 
13623989.49 440.76 85.22 
63710116. 25 2061.15 342.21 
108205623.90 3500.67 492.27 
107296006.20 3471.25 393.99 
75315531. 41 2436.61 242.15 
34714923.40 1123 . 10 123.36 
68987988.51 2231. 90 267.32 
35269787 . 73 1141. 05 139.59 
40889400.28 1322.86 156.54 
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Table 25. Total profit and per unit prof it from crude oil production 
under free trade 
Free Trade 
Year Total profit Profit per unit Profit per unit 
(dirhame ) (dirham per ton) (dollar/ton) 
1979 -1320377.58 -40.63 -10.42 
1980 8360893 . 01 257.30 65.36 
1981 12743334 . 80 392.17 75.82 
1982 60153817 . 56 1851. 21 307 . 36 
1983 102280284.00 3147.64 442 . 62 
1984 101592150 . 50 3126.46 354.86 
1985 70764967.01 2177 . 77 216.42 
1986 32741032.85 1007.59 110 . 67 
1987 65763489.92 2023.85 242.40 
1988 33432231. 79 1028. 8 6 125 . 87 
1989 39244828 . 60 1207.74 142.92 
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CHAPTER 4. 
RESULTS 
This study has identified some important effects of trade 
liberalization on the Moroccan oilseed sector. Econometric analysis 
indicates relevant effects of the free trade agreement with the European 
Community. These effects include increased consumption and imports of 
refined oil, a net gain for consumer and government budgets, a loss for 
the producer (SEPO), and a net gain for society. 
Change in Producer Surplus 
In the analysis of the change in producer surplus, attention has 
focused on the change in SEPO's surplus, which would have been negative 
under Morocco ' s free trade agreement with the European Community . For 
example , in 1989 SEPO's surplus would have decreased by almost 76 percent. 
The change in SEPO's surplus is illustrated in Tables 26 and 27. 
Will SEPO be able to compete in the international market, even with 
the decrease in its surplus? The answer depends upon the level of its 
marginal cost (MC) is situated with respect to the world market price of 
refined oil (PRw). If its marginal cost is less than pRW' the firm can 
survive. But if its marginal cost is greater than PRW' SEPO will be 
forced out of business. From the comparison in Figure 6, it seems that 
SEPO ' s marginal cost has been consistently above the world market price, 
except for 1983 to 1986. This gap has narrowed in the last period (-15 
percent in 1989 in comparison with -46 percent in 1979). Thus, to become 
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Table 26. Change in SEPO's surplus from production of refined oil under 
free trade 
Profit per unit Profit per unit Change in 
under before SEPO's 
Year free trade free trade surplus Change 
(dirham/ton) (dirham/ton) (dirham) (percent) 
1979 -44.88 861. 73 -906.62 -105.21 
1980 286.43 3695.10 -3408.67 -92.25 
1981 440.76 3972. 66 -3531. 90 -88.91 
1982 2061.15 5348.47 -3287.32 -61. 46 
1983 3500 .67 4916 .92 -1416.24 -28.80 
1984 3471.24 5755.80 -2284.55 -39 .69 
1985 2436.61 6750.41 -4313.79 -63.90 
1986 1123 . 09 6245.99 -5122.90 -82.02 
1987 2231. 90 6053.50 -3821. 60 -63 . 13 
1988 1141. OS 4912.59 -3771. 54 -76. 77 
1989 1322.86 5592.64 -4269.78 -76.35 
Table 27. Change in SEPO's surplus from production of crude oil under 
free trade 
Profit per unit Profit per unit Change in 
under before SEPO's 
Year free trade free trade surplus Change 
(dirhams/ton) (dirhams/ton) (dirhams) (percent) 
1979 -40.63 779.81 -820.44 -105.21 
1980 257.30 3292.32 -3035.01 -92.18 
1981 392.17 3469.41 -3077.24 -88.70 
1982 1851. 21 4763.99 -2912.78 -61.14 
1983 3147 . 64 4389.14 -1241. 50 -28 .29 
1984 3126.46 5155.69 -2029.22 - 39.36 
1985 2177.77 6016.16 -3838 . 39 -63.80 
1986 1007 .59 5606 .20 -4598.60 -82. 03 
1987 2023.87 5497.88 -3474.04 -63.19 
1988 1028.86 4454.73 -3425.87 -76.90 
1989 1207.74 5146.79 -3939.04 - 7 6 .53 
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efficient enough to compete successfully with foreign industries under 
free trade, SEPO must reduce production costs. 
Change in consumer Surplus 
From the free trade agreement with the European Community, the 
consumer would gain because of decreases in the domestic prices of refined 
oils . For example, the change in consumer surplus per person in 1989 
would have been almost 30.48 dirharns, the equivalent of $3.60. Table 28 
shows the estimated changes in consumer surplus. 
Table 28. Change in consumer surplus under free trade 
Consumer Consumer 
Consumer surplus Exchange surplus 
Year surplus Population per person rate per person 
(dirhams) (thousands) (dirhams) (dirhams/ (dollars) 
dollars) 
1979 164089475.15 19470 8.42 3.90 2 .16 
1980 326001787.90 20050 16.26 3.94 4.13 
1981 394934351. 25 20646 19.13 5.17 3.70 
1982 347602712.95 20419 17.02 6.02 2.83 
1983 163795864.29 20890 7.84 7 .11 1.10 
1984 94551554 . 32 21465 4.41 8 . 81 0.50 
1985 660295517.09 22068 29.92 10 . 06 2.97 
1986 867166864. 54 22703 38 . 20 9 . 10 4.20 
1987 701514760.31 23376 30.01 8.35 3.59 
1988 764443552 . 67 23059 33.15 8 . 17 4.06 
1989 744640267 . 26 24430 30.48 8.45 3.61 
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Government Revenue 
On average, the consumption subsidy was 1 . 98 dirhams per liter of 
refined oil from 1979 to 1986 (AIRD 1990b, p . 141). The government used 
to pay an average of 2138.238 dirhams per ton of refined oil, but under 
the free trade agreement scenario, it would gain this amount per ton on 
the total consumption of refined oil. For example, in 1989 the Moroccan 
government would have saved 449,742,903 dirhame under the free trade 
agreement option. 
Overall Welfare 
Society as a whole gains from the free trade agreement. Thie is 
shown by summing changes in producer surplus, consumer surplus, and 
government revenue: 
where 
~CS: 
~PS: 
~GR: 
Net Gain: 
744,640,267 . 258 
-234,677,124 . 700 
+449,742,903 . 400 
959,706,045.900 dirhams 
~CS change in consumer surplus, 
~PS = change in producer surplus, and 
~GR = change in government revenue. 
Thus, for 1989, the net gain for all of Moroccan society would have been 
959, 706,046 dirharns, or 113,574,680 dollars. 
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